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Introduction
For more than half of Pakistan’s 75 years of existence, the country has been ruled by
military dictators. Although Pakistan is more or less considered a democracy, I will be arguing in
my thesis that it is, in fact, a garrison-cum-hybrid democratic state (Paul, 2014). I will explain
through various domestic and international events how Pakistan’s military leaders have taken
advantage of several foreign and domestic events to stay in power, even when democratically
elected civilian governments were ruling. The actions and decisions of military rulers have
become institutionalized in Pakistan and shaped its future trajectory in terms of institutional,
political, social and religious norms that non-military leaders have also adopted or been affected
by, thereby hindering their ability to rule democratically. I will use the terms ‘military’ and
‘army’ interchangeably throughout this thesis because army personnel have been the main actors
throughout Pakistan’s extensive periods of military rule.
The time frame of events analyzed in this thesis are from Pakistan’s independence in
1947 till 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew prime minister Nawaz Sharif in a
bloodless coup. Additionally, in a more contemporary setting, I will assess what domestic power
structures in Pakistan can look like in the future by analyzing the role of the China Pakistan
Economic Corridor. I will explain why the military has been as powerful as it was by briefly
analyzing how Ayub Khan propelled the role of the military to that of the most important actor in
the state, particularly focusing on his relation with the United States of America during the Cold
War. To further make my argument for how and why the military has been the most powerful
actor in society, I will focus in-depth on the actions and legislative amendments Zia ul Haq
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implemented to cement his power. Here, I will closely analyze how he capitalized on the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan to extract resources from the U.S. in order to strengthen the Pakistani
military as a sign of regional hegemony. I will also explain how Zia privileged Islam as
Pakistan’s most salient identity and used Islam as his justification for his unconstitutional
actions. Lastly, I will take a look at the role elected civilian leaders — namely Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif — played in perpetuating military supremacy while
also pushing back and carving out a more democratic framework within the country.
T. V. Paul argues that Pakistan is a garrison state because it is constantly preoccupied
with the protection of its natural borders, is always ready to engage in war and the military is the
most dominant actor in society. I will build on this argument by offering a historical analysis of
the military’s foreign endeavors in Afghanistan, Kashmir and against India to show the military’s
obsession with national security, its desire for strategic depth in Afghanistan and strategic parity
with India to gain regional hegemony. Further, I will explain the consequences of these
endeavors on democratic functioning in Pakistan.
Maya Chadda makes the argument that democracy in South Asia must be assessed from
an alternative lens to accommodate for the impacts of colonialism on nation-state consolidation
and economic development at the same time (Chadda, 2000). Chadda also argues that the failure
of democracy in one part of the country or at one moment in time doesn’t equate to failure of the
democratic transition as a whole; I will use this to build on my own argument that despite its
turbulent and politically unstable past, Pakistan has the potential to democratize now because of
some benchmarks it has reached; consistent elections since 2008; widespread political
participation of civilians in the electoral process; decreased military intervention during the rule
of elected civilian leaders; and the power of public opinion in swaying political outcomes.
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I will use Stepan and Linz’s definition of democracy as a yardstick to assess where
Pakistan lies on the democratic spectrum and whether this corresponds with or argues against
Paul’s argument of Pakistan being a garrison-cum-hybrid democratic state.

Pakistan as a garrison-cum-hybrid democratic state
A garrison state is characterized by a constant readiness for war and a need to protect its
borders and assets (Paul, 2014). They emerge in response to perceived internal or external
threats, the latter which Pakistan sees in India and Afghanistan, which I will expand upon in
detail further on. In a garrison state, the military is the most dominant actor in society, which is
befitting for Pakistan where the military has always been the most important decision-maker for
domestic and foreign affairs and national security policy. Garrison states are also characterized
by weak civil-military relations, which was characteristic of Pakistan especially under Zia’s rule
since he clamped down on freedom of the press and banned all political parties, two markers of
strong democracy in a state.
Since its inception in 1947, it has been difficult for Pakistan to sustain viable democratic
institutions. This is because authority has always been with top brass military men ruling the
country who have prevented the full utilization of resources for non-military purposes. Pakistan’s
constant hostility with India and heavy involvement in the Cold War as a frontier state allied with
the United States of America has reinforced the military’s belief that a strong army was
absolutely necessary given the hostile external environment Pakistan found itself in. This is why
national security became a core focus for the military and billions of dollars in foreign assistance
have been diverted primarily to the military to supposedly strengthen its capabilities. For context,
between 1960 and 2012, the amount of foreign aid Pakistan received totalled at least US$73.1
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billion, of which 75 percent went to the military and barely 10 percent to economic development
and socioeconomic uplift (Boon & Ong, 2021).
The consequences of being a garrison-cum-hybrid democratic state, especially in the case
of Pakistan, is that the military has entrenched itself in political, social, economic and religious
affairs when its place in the country should only have been with the country’s defense. Because
of this entrenchment, it has become difficult to erase the excessive militarization of society. In
regards to the country’s defense, and typical of a garrison state, the military focuses on other
state’s capabilities rather than their intentions when assessing threats. It lays emphasis on seizing
windows of opportunity to attack first, which often jeopardizes Pakistan’s standing in
international circles since it is seen as an aggressor incapable of maintaining diplomatic relations
with its neighbors. The biggest and perhaps most long-lasting consequence of the military
turning Pakistan into a garrison state is that the ambitious foreign policies it pursued harmed its
own social fabric and people; Pakistan gradually became a source of transnational Islamist
terrorism, with members of the Mujahideen and other regional terrorist groups perpetuating
ethnic conflict and targeting minority religions in Pakistan.

Why has the military always wanted to stay in power?
A brief history on the formation of the Pakistan military will explain why it has always
been as powerful and salient as it has. Much of the Pakistani military elite (officers, bureaucrats,
landlords) came from Punjab, a demographic also shared by the British Indian armed forces.
Thus, when personnel from the British Indian military left and formed the Pakistani military in
1947, they inherited a culture that glorified military virtues and supported military solutions to
conflict, as the British had done throughout their rule over the Indian subcontinent. Therefore,
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the civil-military regime, which was the most powerful actor in Pakistan at the time of partition,
was comprised of the landed aristocracy who collaborated with the army and bureaucracy to
dominate the political and economic decision-making process in the early years. The failure of
early civilian and military leaders to create a democratic framework rooted in political parties
signaled their desire to concentrate power in their hands and exclude civilians from political
participation, a trend that repeated itself during the rule of military leaders several decades after
independence. Because of this, there were only brief interludes of democracy in Pakistan for the
first two decades; the first ever general elections were held December 1970, more than 20 years
after Pakistan was created; Pakistan didn’t have a constitution until 1956, and between 1947 and
1958 Pakistan has had four governor-generals and seven prime ministers. From this it is evident
that democracy had little chance to flourish because there was no stable framework within which
leaders could build the country, and because the country’s rulers were military men ruling in
authoritarian fashion, they had no interest in working within a democratic framework either.
Since independence, one of the main goals every military leader has envisioned for
Pakistan has been strategic parity with India (Paul, 2014), which translates to regional hegemony
and greater military and political power. They have always wanted to secure Kashmir for
themselves, or at least deter India from claiming complete control over Kashmir, which is why
military leaders have resorted to seizing “windows of opportunity” (Ganguly, 1989) by attacking
India first to gain an advantage in the battlefield. From obtaining nuclear weapons to three direct
wars with India over Kashmir to several indirect attacks on Indian soil backed by the Pakistani
government, military leaders have done all that they can to put Pakistan on equal footing with
India. This military adventurism jeopardized Pakistan’s standing in international circles since it
was seen as an aggressor incapable of maintaining diplomatic relations with its neighbors, but
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this behavior was not a complete shock to Pakistani civilians or international actors since
Pakistan had established itself as a garrison state.
It was for want of strategic parity with India that military leaders, most notably General
Muhammad Zia ul Haq, wanted strategic depth in Afghanistan. After the Soviets retreated from
Afghanistan in 1989, the Pakistani military knew that Afghanistan could not be allowed to
become a fully independent actor and wanted to keep it under Pakistan’s control to prevent India
from allying with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and using them as proxies in attacks on
Pakistan. The Pakistani military didn’t want Pakistan to be surrounded by unfriendly states and
aligned first with the Mujahideen and later with the Taliban to extend its control into
Afghanistan. While this may have been portrayed as a “win” for the military, chasing strategic
depth had severe destabilizing effects on Pakistan, most notably extremism and sectarianism.
Initially, Pakistan trained around 30,000 Taliban militants in camps across Afghanistan who later
attacked Shia and minority groups in Pakistan. What the Pakistani military may not have realized
is that a weak Afghanistan would actually end up producing multiple long-term problems for
Pakistan. Tens of thousands of Mujahideen crossed the border into Pakistan after the Soviet
conflict was over and became the basis of religious extremist groups in the region. Because the
Pakistani military funded, trained and has relied on Islamist militant groups to pursue their
foreign policy endeavours in Afghanistan, these groups have become increasingly powerful in
Pakistan and interfere with democratic governance. They want things to be aligned with their
interpretation of Islam and expect the military to convey their sentiments to elected civilian
leaders. Because it was the military and ISI who enabled these militant groups to become
powerful during the Soviet conflict and still used them as proxy fighters years later, they were
the ones who negotiated with these militant groups to curb their attacks on Pakistani soil instead
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of allowing civilian governments to do this. This was their way of staying relevant during
periods of civilian rule by controlling matters of national security and relations with Afghanistan.
Clinging to Afghanistan was more a show of power dynamics than a need for security and
stability from Afghanistan. The Pakistani public has often encouraged this military adventurism
with its neighbors because the military has perpetuated the narrative that strategic parity with
India is the most important goal for Pakistan above all else. The public did not have the capacity
to demand the creation of democratic institutions or becoming a welfare state because they were
never aware of these possibilities since the military had only perpetuated the narrative of military
might. One such military leader was Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, who ruled from
1958 till 1969, rallied the public around an anti-India narrative and the need for strategic parity
with India which allowed him to hit two birds with one stone; justifying the use of military force
against India as well as inflating the importance of military rule in Pakistan as opposed to the
rule by political parties, which he and other military leaders downplayed at every opportunity
they got. They wanted to stay in power and forestall democratic rule as long as they could and
repeatedly convinced the public through speeches and propaganda that political parties were too
incompetent to rule the country and make important decisions regarding the country’s national
security and foreign policy.

Democracy in a South Asian context and why it has eluded Pakistan
Before assessing the status of democracy in Pakistan, I want to define what democracy is
by building on the definition Alfred Stepen and Juan Linz put forth. They propose that full
democracy is achieved when: a general agreement is reached on procedures for elections; a
government comes to power through popular elections that are free and fair; the government has
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de facto authority to make policies; and the three branches of government (legislative, executive,
judiciary) do not have to share power with other institutions such as the military. In the case of
Pakistan, every elected civilian government has had to share power with the military, which I
will illustrate in detail further on. Stepan and Linz also warn of the “electoralist fallacy” when
gauging the degree of democracy in a country, which is when free and fair elections are
considered a sufficient condition for democracy.
Stepan & Linz’s definition, however, is more Western-centric and not inclusive of
countries who became independent of colonial rule in the 20th century. The South Asian
experience of democracy, as Maya Chadda argues and which I will build upon, is
democratization combined with economic development and state consolidation simultaneously,
as opposed to European states who experienced state consolidation first and economic
development many centuries later. Democracy in South Asia, Chadda argues, is about being
inclusive through bargains to which both the central state and its parts (ethnic or caste-related
identities) have to consent. According to Chadda, poverty, instability, corruption and violence are
problematic but can coexist with gradual democratization, which ties in best with the case of
Pakistan. Further, the failure of democracy in one part of the country or at one moment in time
does not mean failure of the democratic transition as a whole. I will use Chadda’s definition of
democracy as a yardstick when analyzing the status of democracy in Pakistan in my conclusion.
According to elite bargaining theories of democracy, democratization begins when
different segments of the elite agree among themselves that they will follow a process of
bargaining to share power and not concentrate it all for themselves (Chadda, 2000). By this
definition, I argue, Pakistan will be a democracy when the military and elite share power with the
rest of the civilian population through political participation in the electoral process and when
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military leaders stop interfering in the governance of civilian governments in power. Democracy
is achieved when the majority believes democracy is the only way to govern collective life,
which has not been the case in Pakistan since civilians have oscillated their preference for rule
between military dictatorships and civilian governments. I will elaborate on this point further on
to explain why at particular points in Pakistan’s history its civilians have welcomed military
takeovers with open arms and why at other times have pushed for civilian governments and
political parties to take charge of the country’s rule.

How the military came to power — and stayed
The military in Pakistan became as powerful as it did because it was politicized in the
early years of Pakistan’s existence and then capitalized on this to institutionalize its power in
order to cement its dominance. Once the military became a major stake-holder of power, it
elevated national security to the highest salience to maximize resource extraction from the
national economy for the military’s benefits.
What makes the military so powerful in Pakistan is its existence as a part of the larger
military establishment. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) functions as the second military
bureaucratic organization in Pakistan. It was established in 1948 but became more relevant and
powerful in the 1980s as part of the U.S.-led Mujahideen struggle against the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan. The ISI has been more than just an intelligence agency gathering highly
classified information — it has had a prominent role in the country’s foreign policy, especially
with regards to Kashmir and Afghanistan. The ISI has repeatedly subverted the political system
by suppressing political groups the military does not approve of, routinely kidnapping and even
assassinating politicians and journalists at the behest of the military and interfering in the
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electoral process. Former ISI director-general admitted at a Supreme Court hearing in 2012 that
the ISI distributed millions of dollars to politicians and political parties to defeat Benazir Bhutto
in the 1990 election, which ousted Benazir from power and gave Nawaz Sharif his first stint as
prime minister. The ISI has also been a major player in the radicalization of Pakistan by actively
promoting extreme right-wing groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, as well as
collaborating with the Haqqani network. All this was done to maintain the military’s status as the
most powerful political and economic actor in the country, a position that remains unchallenged
since civilian governments have never been strong enough to curb the power of the military or
ISI.
Moreseo, the Pakistan military has proved itself as a savior of the citizens by providing
them with social and economic welfare when civilian institutions failed to do so. The military
has contributed to the development and expansion in the sectors of education, healthcare, disaster
relief and infrastructure, and it also heads several institutions — the Fauji Foundation, a
conglomerate covering food, financial services, natural resources; the Shaheen Foundation, a
welfare foundation of the Pakistan air force; and Defense Housing Authorities. By undertaking
social welfare projects like these, the military has always seen and presented itself to the public
as the stronger alternative to dysfunctional civilian governments, framing political parties as
agents of disunity. By downplaying the idea of a civilian government, the military set the status
quo for civilians to become distrusting of the electoral process and political parties, and,
therefore, the need for democracy in Pakistan. Further, by perpetrating civilian weakness the
military and ISI cemented their power as the most dominant actors of the state since civilian
politicians were not strong enough to curb their power. A man who is critically regarded as being
responsible for the weakening of democracy in Pakistan in its early years is Iskander Mirza, who
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dismissed four prime ministers in his two years in office from 1956 till 1958. In October 1958,
he abrogated the constitution, claiming it was unworkable and would lead to the disintegration of
Pakistan, and imposed the country’s first martial law to pivot away from the democratic
functionings he thought would be the peril of Pakistan, appointing army chief General
Muhammad Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator. Mirza was able to do this because
there were no strong political parties to push back against his declaration of martial law. Mirza’s
unconstitutional interferences in civil administration undermined what little democratic
framework Pakistan had and simultaneously ushered in the beginning of many military
takeovers, which ironically, is how he was ousted from power when Ayub Khan declared himself
president just three weeks after Mirza made him chief martial law administrator.
One military leader in Pakistan followed another when Ayub Khan handed over the
presidency to General Yahya Khan in March 1969, yet another example of military supremacy
trumping democratic norms in the country. The first general elections in 1970 may have given
the impression that Pakistan was pivoting towards democracy, but, as Stepan and Linz warned of
the electoral fallacy, competitive elections are not a definitive marker of democracy or
democratization in a nation-state. Yahya wanted to stay in power and wanted a fragmented result
of the 1970 elections so that the opposition was not united enough to oust him, which the
military ensured for him by working behind the scenes to ensure that the Constituent Assembly
was so fragmented that it would be impossible to draft a constitution. The military obviously
wanted a military leader in power to have command over key decision-making aspects in the
country. Further, the military regime had tried to safeguard Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic
ideological state before allowing the people to vote in the 1970 elections, which was the
beginning of Islam standing as a pillar of utmost importance in Pakistan above other factors such
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as democracy or being a welfare state. Propaganda through state-controlled media and changes in
academic curriculum would forestall elected politicians’ attempts to alter Pakistan’s orientation
fundamentally, which is what Yahya Khan’s successor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to do with
his “socialist Islam” and paid the price for it with his life. The 1970 election is an early example
of military interference in democratic functioning in the country, and I argue that instances like
these set the tone for military supremacy in Pakistan that overshadowed any attempts at
democratization.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto succeeded Yahya Khan as President of Pakistan from 1971-1973 and
then Prime Minister from 1973-1977. He was the first civilian to hold the post of Civilian
Martial Law Administrator, a position that afforded military leaders greater authority to impose
martial law and disrupt civilian rule in a country. Although Bhutto’s time in office was arguably
the longest glimpse of democracy the country got till he was ousted in 1977, he actually
strengthened the military’s role more than curb it. An example is his reliance on and excessive
use of force by the military against Balochi rebels who were not in favor of the Pakistani
government. There were mass uprisings in Balochistan after he dismissed the provincial
government in 1973 on the pretext that arms had been discovered at the Iraqi Embassy in
Balochistan which would facilitate the Baloch rebels. Bhutto contained these uprisings by
sending the military into Balochistan to crush the rebels, a move that pleased the military since
they were able to gain some face after losing the war with India in 1971. Instead of unleashing
the army on the Baloch people, Bhutto could have co-opted them and reached a compromise
with them regarding their grievances with the government. As per Chadda’s definition, this
would have been an opportunity for the bargaining process where power was shared among other
actors and not concentrated solely in the hands of the elites. This was a shot at democratization
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for Bhutto which he squandered, and instead he did what past leaders have done and relied on
military might to secure his position in power.
It was also under Bhutto’s regime that Pakistan saw the rise of fundamentalist Islamic
groups opposed to his populist and socialist reforms that they claimed could not go hand in hand
with Islam. Although many consider Zia responsible for Pakistan’s “Islamization”, it was
actually under Bhutto’s rule that Islamic radicalism took off; he declared Ahmadis non-Muslims,
which was ratified in the constitution through the Second Amendment September 17, 1974. He
also enshrined Islamization within the 1973 constitution which declared Pakistan an Islamic
Republic and Islam as the state religion. This was the beginning of Islam being used to justify
decisions of leaders to keep them in power on the pretext that Pakistan was meant to be an
Islamic state, which ultimately forces democratic instituions and norms to take a backseat.
Bhutto was ousted from power because he was unlike the military leaders whom he
preceded and succeeded, which is why the military knew they could not work with him in power
and acted swiftly to remove him. While Bhutto missed the opportunity to transform Pakistan into
a welfare state and focus on economic and social development, I argue that many of his actions
with regards to foreign actors actually pivoted Pakistan away from its bravado as a garrison state.
Throughout his time in power he didn’t pursue strategic parity with India through military
adventures or “seizing windows of opportunities” as is typical of garrison states and as was the
agenda of several military leaders before and after him. This is not to say that he did not work to
strengthen Pakistan militarily after a traumatic loss to India in the 1971 war; he did, when he
managed to secure considerable military assistance from China in the 1970s and purchased
weapons from Europe when military assistance from the US plunged dramatically in that time
period. Can we take Bhutto’s distancing from strategic parity with India as a sign of civilian
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leaders’ independence from military goals? Was this his attempt at ushering in democratization
in Pakistan? Perhaps not, given his reliance on the military to hold on to power, as well as his
reliance on foreign aid and assistance to prop up Pakistan economically rather than generating
wealth internally through development and taxation. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a classic example
of civilian rulers largely following in the footsteps of military leaders despite having an open
shot at democratizing the country. The mindset of using the military to hold on to power and
relying on foreign assistance to strengthen the economy had become deeply entrenched by the
time Bhutto came to power, and it has largely stayed that way since. Looking at the bigger
picture, the blame can’t be placed squarely on civilian leaders for squandering their shot at
democratization when the entire political system in Pakistan has been crafted to concentrate all
legitimate power in the hands of the military. The larger military establishment has controlled
matters of national security, foreign policies, domestic affairs and keeping military leaders in
power, so it is no surprise that democratically elected leaders often co-opt the military for
personal gain, not only to appease the military but also because that is the only way they can
access power.
I argue, however, that Bhutto’s removal from power by Zia says more about the failure of
democracy in Pakistan at that time than his own shortcomings do. Zia’s ban on political parties
meant there weren’t any people or institutions holding him accountable for his authoritarian
actions. For context, the Pakistan National Alliance was formed in 1977 as a cohort of political
parties campaigning against the Pakistan People’s Party. They wanted to use Zia to get rid of
Bhutto and his PPP and make room for a more pro-business regime, contrary to Bhutto’s socialist
policies and nationalization of several industries. Zia played his cards well and pitted the PNA
against the PPP, allowing the military more room for political maneuvering. Through Operation
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Fairplay executed 5th July 1977, Zia deposed Bhutto through a bloodless coup to cement his
power. The Supreme Court eventually ruled in favor and legitimized Zia’s military intervention,
which was both a blow to any semblance of democracy in Pakistan at that time as well as the
beginning of institutional legitimacy of authoritarian tactics by military leaders. It was no
surprise that they ruled in favor of Zia because just weeks after Zia overthrew Bhutto, he forcibly
removed Chief Justice Yaqub Ali from office because he knew Ali was democratic and would
rule against Zia’s illegal actions. Bhutto’s hanging in 1979 ultimately proved that there was
always a price to pay when you went against the military in Pakistan.

Zia, Islamization and the irreparable damage to Pakistan
It was under Zia’s regime that militarism and Islam became twin pillars shaping
Pakistan’s identity. The military, and more specifically, the top brass in the military, became the
most privileged caste in Pakistan, while Islamization was folded into every political and
socioeconomic aspect in the country. Because many top level bureaucrats and military personnel
believed Islam should be a centralizing factor in Pakistan, they welcomed Islamization
overtaking the functioning of democratic institutions. One such example is the power of the
Federal Shariat Court to have executive jurisdiction for certain matters that circumvent the ruling
of civil courts. Zia’s Islamization went so far as to give Pakistan’s nuclear program an Islamic
tint, defining it as a shared asset for all Muslims. He fused religion and military power and
presented it to the public as a sort of symbiosis, with the military helping to uphold Islam and
Islam being infused into military practices and norms. It is interesting to note that the Pakistan
army was always born an ideological army that justified Islam as its corpotate identity; Zia just
capitalized on the undertones of Islam within the military to justify his imposition of martial law
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and cement his authority in power. When he declared himself president of Pakistan, he
announced that his real source of power came from his status as army commander, not as
president. As previous military leaders in Pakistan had done before, this was his way of giving
the military an inflated sense of importance when he came to power, signaling to the public that a
military man is the best fit for the country.
From the get go, Zia cemented his power by banning all political parties in 1978 to avoid
opposition parties clubbing together against him like the PNA did against Bhutto. This was one
of his more explicit, straight cut ways of killing democracy in the country, but his imposition of
the Eighth Amendment into the Constitution of Pakistan in 1985 changed the country’s
governance for the worse till it was repealed in 1997. The Eighth Amendment changed the
governance system in Pakistan from a parliamentary democracy to a semi-presidential system
that allowed the president to dissolve the national assembly and elected governments and
eventually dismiss the prime minister and their cabinet on the grounds of instability, intolerant
levels of corruption, mismanagement and unchecked levels of domestic violence. Further, the
Eighth Amendment allowed domestic and national security affairs — the Afghan policy, nuclear
weapons, relations with India, the national defense budget, institutional privileges of officers and
full control of the military — to be concentrated in the hands of the president. At this point
Pakistan could hardly be called a democracy since it tethered on the lines of being a dictatorship,
which many international actors and allies saw it as and were becoming weary of Pakistan’s
internal cohesion because democracy was gradually failing. The Eighth Amendment essentially
gave rise to constant conflict between the president and prime minister, which culminated in
Zia’s dismissal of Prime Minister Muhammud Khan Junejo 29th May 1988 on the grounds of
corruption. In Pakistan, dismissals have often been a guise for removing people who might
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become too powerful or better liked by the public, which was the case with some of the
dismissals in Pakistan in the 1990s. This is a classic move military dictators use to keep
themselves in power by removing any form of opposition or threat to their regime.
Even though Zia agreed to hold elections in 1985, they were partyless elections and not a
true sharing of power with civilians. But what is interesting to note about the 1985 elections is
that it was actually Junejo who pushed for them to begin with. Junejo was also the one who
ended Zia’s eight-and-a-half years of martial law in December 1985 and restored freedom of the
press. Junejo’s short stint as prime minister from 1985 to 1988 should not be overlooked since it
comes under Zia’s military dictatorship. If anything, it was an oasis of democracy during Zia’s
dictatorship and should be considered as the beginning of the gradual transition to democracy
that Benazir Bhutto ushered in when she took over as prime minister in the 1988 elections. That
Junejo was not a military man suggested at that point in time that non-military figures in power
had and possibly could have the potential to steer Pakistan towards greater democratization as
Junejo attempted to. As is evident, being prime minister was not symbolic of democracy because
at the end of the day it was under Zia’s military dictatorship; however, it did symbolize that there
were domestic actors who were willing to push back against military dominance and restore
democracy bit by bit.
Within Pakistan, Zia tightened his grip on power through dismissals, the Eighth
Amendment and banning political parties, among other measures. On the outside, Zia played his
cards well and took advantage of foreign actors and interventions to strengthen his position as
supreme military leader by bringing in massive amounts of foreign aid and armaments into the
country. He often fused his military finesse with capital gains by providing military advisers and
trainers to several countries in exchange for cash or arrangements to pay for military equipment;
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for example, Libya gave Pakistan $200 million to purchase arms in exchange for Pakistani pilots
for the Libyan Air Force, while Abu Dhabi also contracted Pakistani pilots for its own air force
in exchange for funding Pakistan’s purchase of 32 Mirage V fighter aircraft from France
(Haqqani, 2013). While there was no economic development within the country to generate this
kind of revenue, the fact that Zia managed to secure this kind of funding was enough to prove his
military competence and ability to keep Pakistan afloat economically.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) saw significant overlap with Zia’s rule
in Pakistan from 1977-1988. The U.S. was fighting a proxy war against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan and allied with Pakistan owing to its geostrategic location as Afghanistan’s
neighbor. For more than a decade, the U.S. funneled billions of dollars worth of aid, weapons
and training into Pakistan so that Zia could train the Mujahideen in Afghanistan who were
fighting against the Soviets. The issue here is that the Mujahideen were more than just freedom
fighters trying to wrest back their country from the Soviets; they gradually became Islamist
extremists who used religion as their justification for violence and a means to obtain arms and
funding, which went hand-in-hand with Zia’s desire to “Islamize” Pakistan and the military in
particular. These Mujahideen later became the core of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other Islamist
militant groups who were responsible for much of the instability, violence, conflict and ethnic
disparity in the region that not only left Afghanistan in ruins but also impacted Pakistan’s
political and economic stability and national security. Because it was Zia who trained, funded
and sheltered the Mujahideen via money received from the U.S., international actors began
seeing Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism because of its reliance on Islamist militant groups
as instruments of foreign policy regarding India and Afghanistan. As the Afghan conflict was
drawing to an end, Zia took advantage of the well-trained, well-armed Mujahideen and recruited
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them for fighting alongside insurgencies in Kashmir, inspiring them by branding it an “Islamic
cause” which convinced them to fight beyond the Afghan cause.
While many saw America’s victory in Afghanistan as a “win” for Pakistan and Zia in
particular, it did considerable, irreparable damage to Pakistan that continues to destabilize
Pakistan even today. To begin with, it reinforced the belief that Islam sanctioned asymmetric
warfare and therefore shoud be a part of national military strategy, which was a huge win for Zia.
Further, military leaders like Zia were focused on making a garrison state out of Pakistan and
saw the influx of foreign aid and weapons as economic success since it empowered the military.
But this had no tangible effect on Pakistan’s economy or civilians in actuality because the money
was either pocketed by military personnel or used by the military to increase their armaments
and continue funding religious militant groups. None of this aid trickled down to ordinary
civilians, nor was Zia (or other military leaders before him) interested in developing a welfare
state. There was no actual economic growth in the country, no development in terms of hospitals,
schools and other institutions that modernize society and bolster democracy through institutional
practices. Zia was interested in perpetuating the struggle with India and obtaining strategic depth
in Afghanistan, which is why he made pacts with radical Islamist and ethnic-based groups rather
than expanding trade networks and focusing on generating revenue from within the country.
It is important to remember that it was under Zia’s rule that the ISI and the larger
military-intelligence establishment became one of the most powerful and deadly entities in
Pakistan and remain so even today. This military-intelligence establishment is the “deep state”
which is selective of who to fight and who to support, a decision that should typically be in the
hands of the government but isn’t, underscoring the immense power the deep state has and the
lack of actual decision-making power for the government. The deep state may not operate in
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plain sight but its presence is definitely known; anyone who dares to challenge the military
establishment risks assassination, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto or face exile, as Nawaz Sharif and
Benazir Bhutto did. The ISI gained prominence and immense power under Zia’s rule, and, like
the rest of the country, adopted his ideology of privileging Islamist militants. Based off growing
evidence there developed a fear that elements of the military and ISI may may sympathize with
Islamist mniltants, or that a rogue Islamist faction may split off from the army and be beyond the
control of the army, ISI or military establishment and potentially undermine the state or support
Islamist militancy. More concerning than this, however, is that Islamist elements within the army
may provide terrorists with nuclear weapons, which isn’t too much of a stretch considering
leaders like Benazir Bhutto have facilitated nuclear proliferation. This is a direct consequence of
the unchecked power of military leaders who in turn enabled actors like the ISI and religious
extremists to grow as powerful as they did, which, in turn, overshadowed the power of
democratically elected governments.

Blame game: was it all the military’s fault?
At the time of Zia’s death in 1988 and more than 40 years after its creation, Pakistan
stood at the intersection of being a garrison state with the risk of being overrun by Islamist
militants who were remnants from the Soviet conflict and used Islam and jihad as their context
for violent territorial warfare. Successive military dictators who focused on making Pakistan a
garrison state failed to develop Pakistan economically, socially or politically, leaving it in bad
shape for those who preceded Zia. This begets the question of how Pakistan reached this point of
military supremacy, and who enabled the military and military leaders to become the most
powerful actors in society; the answer is the U.S. Right from Pakistan’s first leader Muhammad
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Ali Jinnah, Pakistani leaders have always expected the U.S. to help out financially and militarily
since the U.S. was more than capable of sparing a few million dollars and Pakistan was a new
nation-state barely standing on its own two feet. Pakistani leaders also took advantage of the
international political climate to lure the U.S. into a sweet deal with Pakistan, mostly during the
Cold War. For example, Ayub Khan disguised his anti-India stance with anti-communism to
butter up US diplomats even more, telling them that India wanted to get the U.S. out of Asia
(Haqqani, 2013). He cautioned that if they didn’t help Pakistan in their conquests against India,
Pakistan would turn away from the U.S. and then the U.S. would lose both India and Pakistan as
allies. From 1954-1959 alone, Pakistan’s military received $425 million in aid from the U.S.,a
generous amount that kept the military satisfied yet eager for more. In the backdrop, U.S.
diplomats were observing the increasing dysfunctionality in Pakistan which the U.S. was
exacerbating when it propped up militarization in the country through massive amounts of aid
and weapons. The military became Pakistan’s “safe anchor” (Haqqani, 2013) because of all the
foreign equipment, training and aid it was receiving, but relying primarily on the army as the
framework for the young state made Ayub and early military leaders questionable to work with.
Nonetheless, the U.S. continued to rely on Pakistan as a strategic ally in the region, which Zia
exploited to a high degree. Because the U.S. was slightly shocked when the Soviet military
actually invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Zia knew the U.S. government wouldn’t mind paying a
higher price for securing Pakistan as an ally against the Soviets. The U.S. believed that once
Pakistan got its military aid, it would give the U.S. the bases it wanted in Pakistan, fulfill the
U.S.’s goals and the problems with India and Afghanistan would wither away. As they later
realized, this was a grave mistake since Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. was driven by its quest
for strategic parity with India, while the U.S. initially wanted to capitalize on Pakistan’s
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geostrategic location to make it a major fighting force in Asia to defend against communism. The
consequence of the U.S. enabling Pakistan through aid and weapons is that it could not stop
Pakistan from using Jihadi militants (Islamist extremists) as proxies in regional conflicts, such as
in Kashmir and Afghanistan in the 1990s, nor could it stop Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear
weapons program despite asking Pakistan for the promise that they wouldn’t. Decade after
decade, the U.S. enabled Pakistani leaders to seize the opportunity of external alliances to
address domestic issues, which, in the short run benefitted the leaders but in the long run gave no
advantage to the U.S. and only increased the power of the Mujahideen and the other Islamist
extremist groups they morphed into.
Moreso, Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. got it more aid from other countries, such as the
U.K., Japan and Germany and international institutions such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. These allies and financial supporters didn’t make democracy a condition for
receiving economic aid, which is why Pakistani leaders didn’t focus on economic development,
institutional reform or resource extraction as other developing countries were incentivized to in
order to receive economic aid from these very institutions. Further, these allies would never let
the Pakistani economy collapse because they needed Pakistan for their own geostrategic
interests, which is also why international organizations turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear
proliferation since Pakistan had the capability to carry out or thwart the U.S.’s policy objectives.
There were several consequences of international actors letting Pakistan off the hook; military
leaders were not held accountable or forced to create a welfare state in an economically failing
nation. The rule of military leaders who came to power undemocratically was legitimized by
foreign actors, which perpetuated the cycle of military leaders handing over power to one
another. Further, these military leaders perpetuated the cycle of turmoil and violence both within
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the country and in Kashmir and Afghanistan so that the military could stay relevant and continue
receiving aid; if Pakistan’s security problem is solved then its allies will stop sending foreign aid,
weapons and assistance to Pakistan. The continuation of the security problem has been in the
material and corporate interest of the army and military-intelligence establishment, which is why
even during civilian periods of rule military leaders have tried to control the nation’s security and
financial matters to extract resources from foreign actors. In short, foreign actors have enabled
Pakistan to believe it will always receive the aid and weapons it needs to carry out its
adventurous foreign policy endeavors and the military has fully taken advantage of this to
constantly pursue its own agenda.
The actions of military leaders produced dire consequences during the rule of civilian
regimes. Military leaders, most notably Zia, set future civilian leaders up for failure because they
created a Pakistan that was only prosperous when it was a useful geopolitical ally during times of
international political turmoil, such as the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan during the Cold War. As
the Cold War drew to an end, military and economic assistance from foreign allies grew smaller
or came with harsher terms. For example, in 1990 U.S. aid to Pakistan was suspended by then
president George H. W. Bush in accordance with the Pressler Amendment, which allowed aid to
flow to Pakistan as long as the U.S. president could annually certify that Pakistan did not possess
a nuclear explosion device. Pakistan’s nuclear development program was no secret by then,
neither were the sanctions a surprise. With Pakistan no longer being used to fight America’s
proxy war in Afghanistan, the billions of dollars worth of aid and armaments were barely coming
in at a trickle, leaving Pakistan’s first civilian leader since Zia — Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
— floundering without the backing of foreign allies or a unifying anti-India, pro-Islamization
rhetoric buttressing her popularity. If anything, she and her successor Nawaz Sharif spent both
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their respective terms as prime minister in the 1990s doing everything they could to secure their
power and avoid being ousted by the military, which ended up happening anyway. The military
establishment had created a political system that continuously privileged the military as the most
dominant actor in society since it had curated institutional and civilian support over the years by
downplaying the very factors of democratic rule that could oust it from power. Had there been
regular elections and freedom of the press and political parties since independence, citizens
might have reacted negatively to such frequent military takeovers.
Despite being democratically elected with the potential to gradually democratize
Pakistan, Benazir chose to continue on the path of using and misusing religion as past leaders
had done to fulfill their foreign policy agenda, most likely to prove to the military top brass that
she shared in their agenda. As soon as she came to power she threw her support behind the
Taliban in Afghanistan, extremist groups in Kashmir and the nuclear weapons programme in
Pakistan. She wanted to create a Western-oriented trade and pipeline route from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan through Southern Afghanistan with the plan in mind that the Taliban would provide
security along this route. Alongside supporting insurgents in Indian Occupied Kashmir, she
helped create terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Paul, 2013);
their initial goals were to fight India in Kashmir but later expanded to a more transnational
narrative with al-Qaeda and other global terrorist organizations. Benazir also augmented
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program through nuclear transfers to North Korea, Iran and Libya.
She also oversaw a missile swap between Pakistan and North Korea with the help of Abdul
Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear physicist who is considered the founder of Pakistan’s atomic
weapons program. All of this is indicative of how civilian leaders undermined Pakistan’s
potential to emerge as a strong, tolerant and democratic state.
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However, Benazir was also confronted on all sides by powerful actors who wanted to see
her downfall; the president at that time, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, enhanced the president’s power
under the amended constitution (Eighth Amendment) which limited Benazir’s scope of authority
as prime minister. The military insisted on retaining authority over Afghan policy, foreign and
national security affairs and butted heads with Benazir who wanted to control these issues as part
of her position’s jurisdiction. Nawaz Sharif, her main opposition at the time, was focused on
strengthening Punjab and other provinces at the expense of the central government in the hopes
that he could remove her from power in the next elections. In Sindh, Punjab and what was then
known as the North West Frontier Province, electoral contests were between Bhutto’s PPP and
Nawaz Sharif’s anti-Bhutto opposition, which he gained support from by releasing documents
about her corruption through personal expenses. Understandably, Benazir’s PPP government
couldn’t have made much progress with these barriers. It is also understandable that Benazir was
always watching Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s every move because he had the power to remove her and
dissolve her government as per the Eighth Amendment. Benazir’s fears were well founded
because on 6th August 1990, Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Bhutto government and
dissolved the National Assembly. His justification for this was that Bhutto’s actions endangered
democracy because of bribery in the National Assembly, the failure of her government to
maintain law and order, misuse of state power to accumulate personal wealth and incompetency
in the administration of the economy. Additionally, the army had frequently complained to Khan
about Bhutto “interfering” in their matters as a way to indirectly remove her from power.
Although Khan himself was not a military man, he was a close ally of Zia and his successive
sacking of two democratically elected prime ministers did much damage to what little democracy
was budding in Pakistan.
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Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s dismissal of Nawaz Sharif in 1993, I argue, was a pivotal point for
democracy in Pakistan. There was a decrease in foreign remittances from overseas Pakistanis
working in the Gulf due to the Gulf crisis in the early 1990s coupled with the drying up of
foreign aid from the U.S. owing to the end of the Afghan war. There an urgency to restructure
government policies so that Pakistan could lay down a legal and physical framework for a
market-oriented, rule-based economy, which is exactly what Sharif did when he implemented a
market-based solution Pakistan’s economy performed better from 1991-1992 than it had in
previous years, and Sharif was seen as a business-friendly and action-oriented prime minister. It
was Sharif’s relative success that drove president Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dismiss Sharif in April
1993. Sharif’s market-oriented economic policies were popular with international donors who
were crucial to Pakistan’s aid-dependent economy. By this time, international actors had begun
correspondence with civilian leaders after decades of dealing with military dictators who only
wanted aid and weapons to strengthen the military for regional hegemony. Sharif also
consolidated a popular base both inside and outside parliament, tilting the informal balance of
power in favor of elected elements. This shift in power away from civil-military bureaucracy was
the main threat to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whose insecurities stemmed from the viceregal system of
authority in Pakistan he belonged to. After seeing previous presidents enjoy their power
unchallenged, Sharif’s success and popularity was a huge blow to the otherwise privileged
bureaucratic caste in politics. As president, he believed power lay in his hands and his priority
was keeping Sharif in check and ensuring his own success in the next elections.
Sharif has been one of the few civilian leaders in Pakistan to push back against the
supremacy of the military and top-level bureaucrats in the country who have always wanted
power concentrated in their hands. Sharif wanted to reverse the Eighth Amendment to restore
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power to the prime minister, causing Khan to eventually dismiss Sharif and dissolve the
assembly, but Sharif appealed to the Supreme Court who restored Sharif to power. Sharif and
Khan found themselves in a political gridlock that paralyzed the central government and saw the
economy becoming vulnerable as foreign reserves plummeted. Chief of Army Staff General
Abdul Waheed Kakar temporarily took the reins and demanded the resignations of both Sharif
and Khan.
The third dismissal of an elected government meant two things for democracy in
Pakistan. On the one hand, it showed repeated patterns of arbitrary interventions from military
personnel, signaling the military’s stronghold on Pakistani politics and the functioning of elected
governments. On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s decision to restore Sharif’s government
showed a strengthening of elected elements since the judiciary was acting independent of
coercion from the military or any other actors. The military had taken a step back from ruling the
country directly and since power lay with civilian leaders, appointees to the judicial system
weren’t necessarily those with whom the military curried favor. Under Zia’s rule, several judges
and politicians were jailed, removed from power as Chief Justice Yaqub ALi was, or chose not to
be a part of Zia’s dictatorship; they returned to or were reappointed to their various offices under
Bhutto and Sharid’s regime. Many of them were tied to serving democratically and did not
privilege any one group over the other, which is why Sharif was reinstated to power.
Further, public opinion had become one of the most crucial factors affecting political
outcomes in Pakistan, something that the military became highly weary of. Military leaders
wanted to tread carefully since they feared a negative reaction from the public that would make
them seem authoritarian and ready to clamp down on civil liberties. They knew that even though
Pakistan’s history and political legacy gave them preeminence over elected governments, their
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authority now needed popular justification. Zia’s death and takeover of the country by Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, a non-military ruler, meant that military rule was not the norm any more and not the
only option the people of Pakistan had to contend with. Political parties may have been corrupt,
but they opened up doors to wider participation in the government and this, I argue, greatly
strengthened democracy in Pakistan.
This is also why Pakistan is a garrison-cum-hybrid democratic state and not a democracy
altogether; the military and civilian governments are constantly competing for power with each
other and the remnants of decades of military rule are difficult to do away with overnight.
Elected leaders like Benazir feared being overthrown and oftentimes pandered to the military to
stay in power rather than trying to democratize Pakistan. Public opinion also swayed between
wanting rule by elected political parties and a return to a military dictatorship, which many
welcomed when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Sharif in a bloodless military coup
October 12, 1999. The public was not rejecting democracy so much as it was rejecting the
chaotic and corrupt rule that civilian leaders and their political parties brought with them.
The brief interlude of rule by elected civilian governments in the 1990s was foundational
for the development of democracy in Pakistan. The judiciary was functioning independently and
helped civilian leaders push back against interference from bureaucratic actors. Pakistan lessened
its reliance on aid and military equipment from the U.S. and began generating revenue through
economic growth and alternative trade deals in the Middle East. That the public’s opinion was
powerful enough to deter the military from behaving rashly was indicative of the strengthening
of democracy in Pakistan and a huge departure from a clamp down on free speech and freedom
of the press under martial law. Military leaders had always perpetuated the narrative that political
parties are incompetent and incapable of running the country. Now, Pakistanis do not embrace
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military authoritarianism over long periods of time because now the military itself fails to
manage the state better than the civilian governments they dismissed. The public eventually
demands a return to democracy, as they did after almost a decade of Musharraf in power.

Transnational powerplay: CPEC and Pakistan’s military establishment
Despite the 1990s seeing the foundation of democracy laid in Pakistan, democracy has
not developed much since then because the military found ways to control domestic and national
security policies, just less overtly than before. One of these ways was the military capitalizing on
Pakistan’s strengthening alliance with China. As the U.S. withered away as Pakistan’s strongest
ally and biggest donor of aid and armaments, China replaced this role and is responsible for
perpetuating and benefiting from the military establishment’s dominance in Pakistan. China and
Pakistan’s relationship is lopsidedly symbiotic. China is important to Pakistan because it acts as
its primary external balancer against India, has helped Pakistan develop as a nuclear state and is
now Pakistan’s main arms supplier. China, following in the footsteps of Pakistan’s previous
allies, is using Pakistan’s geostrategic location to signal to India that it has greater regional
dominance. China perceives India as a threat and strategic concern, particularly after the 1962
war. By allying with Pakistan, China wants to keep India on its toes to forestall India from
challenging China on a wider regional basis. I argue that China wants to continue the rivalry
between India and Pakistan to keep India preoccupied, while Pakistan wants to continue its
rivalry with India to avenge lost territories and gain regional hegemony in keeping with the
garrison state narrative set by military leaders.
China has been exerting greater regional hegemony through the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan. On a surface level, CPEC is a geoeconomic project in
Pakistan that is supposed to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries, pull up
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Pakistan’s failing economy and enhance China’s energy security. But at a deeper level, CPEC has
given immense importance to the military establishment in Pakistan since China trusts that the
military will provide the security and cooperation needed for CPEC to succeed over the years. It
has given the military the importance and financial backing it needs to maintain control over
domestic affairs in Pakistan. When U.S. President Donald Trump suspended aid to Pakistan in
2018, China duly provided $4.5 billion worth of financial assistance to Pakistan for the fiscal
year 2018-2019. Once again, in the short-run this may seem like a “win” for the elite actors in
Pakistan to have billions of dollars at their disposal, but in the long-run it has disincentivized
elite actors from bolstering further economic development in Pakistan.
Additionally, the military establishment is the most trusted and preferred interlocutor for
Beijing, so much so that in 2018, Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa was invited
to Beijing to discuss CPEC rather than newly inaugurated Imran Khan. CPEC holds too much
geostrategic importance for China to see it sabotaged by weak internal security in Pakistan and
incompetent civilian leaders. Chinese officials also have decades worth of experience dealing
with Pakistani military leaders, so this is not the first time the military has been engaged in
geopolitical affairs.
The military establishment wants to use CPEC as leverage to extract more weapons,
technology and cooperation from Beijing to continue their objective of strategic parity with
India, which is why the military has devoted increasing amounts of resources to safeguard
Chinese assets, mostly in response to pressure from Beijing. That foreign actors are controlling
domestic affairs in Pakistan, such as terrorism and the lack of security, is indicative of the
immense power China has in Pakistan to achieve its goals. To that end, China’s communication
with the military is more effective than communication with the Pakistani premier not only
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because the military possesses the necessary manpower and expertise, but also because its
intelligence wing, the ISI, maintains important links to several militant groups that target Indian
interests on behalf of Pakistan.
The grandiose of CPEC begets the question of what results CPEC has produced for
Pakistan thus far. CPEC is also raising Pakistan’s debt levels, which Imran Khan is addressing by
asking China and international financial institutions for loans to pay off those debts. In June
2019, Chinese Foreign Direct Investments to Pakistan dramatically fell by 77%, making it safe to
say that CPEC hasn’t given Pakistan any “game-changing” economic progress yet. China, like
Pakistan’s other allies have done, is simply exploiting Pakistan for its geostrategic location for its
own geopolitical goals and regional hegemony; democratizing Pakistan is not a priority.

Conclusion
Pakistan is currently recognized as a democratic state because it holds regular elections
under a competitive multiparty political system. In actuality, real power in Pakistan lies with the
military and greater military establishment who have historically been the most important actors
in society. Some civilian leaders, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had the opportunity to democratize
Pakistan but focused on securing power for themselves, while others, like Benazir had a similar
goal but were ruling at a time where the military had the power to hang, exile, or dismiss civilian
governments as they pleased, which is exactly what happened to Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif over their various terms. The military has always been in the backdrop of Pakistan’s
domestic and international political affairs, simply finding new events and actors to take
advantage of to fulfill their desire for strategic parity with India. Ayub Khan capitalized on the
Cold War to squeeze money out of the U.S., while Zia exploited the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan to cement his power, prop up Islam and the military as twin pillars shaping
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Pakistan’s identity and have the U.S. pour billions of dollars worth of aid and armaments to help
him achieve these goals in the guise that he’ll help them win their proxy war against the Soviets.
Now, the greater military establishment has taken advantage of CPEC and strengthened allyship
with China to reclaim power and authority over domestic affairs in Pakistan.
Analyzing 75 years of tumultuous history in Pakistan allows us to envision what its future
holds. Democracy does exist in Pakistan, despite several decades of successive military
dictatorships. Civilian leaders, democratic institutions such as the judiciary and public opinion
have collectively pushed back against the military’s supremacy, which is also how democracy
has grown. Political parties may be corrupt and civilian leaders may have squandered the
nation’s money for personal use, but, as Chadda explained, poverty, instability, corruption and
violence can coexist with gradual democratization and should not be seen as a failure of
democracy. For now, Pakistan’s status will remain that of a garrison-cum-hybrid democracy.
Could a member of the military top brass stage another coup or overthrow the civilian
government to come back in power? If their professional and corporate interests can be protected
adequately from a distance — which is what it is working towards by making puppets out of
civilian governments — they will not be tempted to step in directly and establish military rule
once again. Given how much importance Zia and Benazir gave to Islamist militant groups, there
is a strong possibilty that deteriorating stability in Afghanistan and the rule of the Taliban can
produce dire consequences for Pakistan in the future. Even so, it will be the military
establishment, not the civilian government, who deals with that crisis when it comes.
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